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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
CaseNo.20111026-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to § 78A-3-102(4). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are reproduced as Addendum A to Appellant's Brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1 -904 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-5-825 (2008) 
The following are attached hereto as Addendum "A": 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-801 (2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-802 (2004) 
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Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-803 (2004) 
Restatement (Third) of Property §4.13 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 29, 2008, Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District ("NFSSD") 
filed a Complaint against Defendant Robert Bennion ("Bennion"), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
("Judge Hansen") presiding. R. 1-6. Bennion filed his Answer to the Complaint on May 
21, 2008. R. 10-20. On May 27, 2008, Bennion filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint. R. 21-27. On June 18, 2008, NFSSD filed an Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 33-40. On July 2, 2008, Bennion filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R. 41-47. On August 25, 2008, Bennion's 
Motion to Dismiss was before the trial court for oral arguments, and Judge Hansen ruled 
(1) Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action would be Dismissed (not at issue for this appeal), 
and (2) that Bennion had ten days to file "a final brief " and NFSSD then had ten days to 
submit its "final brief." R. 58, attached hereto as Addendum "B." On September 3, 
2008, Bennion submitted his "final brief," i.e. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R. 62-81. On September 17, 2008, NFSSD submitted 
its "final brief," i.e. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 101-132. On October 1, 2008, the trial court entered a Decision 
regarding Bennion's Motion to Dismiss. R. 151-55, attached hereto as Addendum "C." 
2 
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On May 19, 2010, NFSSD filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 170-209. 
On June 14, 2010, Bennion filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. 210-63. However, NFSSD filed a Motion to Strike Portions of 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit "A" to Defendant's Opposition Memorandum - Robert Bennion's Affidavit, and 
Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Opposition Memorandum - Excerpts from Pamela Vincent's 
Deposition ("Motion to Strike"). R. 279-90. NFSSD's Motion to Strike was folly 
briefed. R. 291-305. 
After NFSSD filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, said motion was heard by the trial court. R. 265-78 and R. 445. 
The trial court granted NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
R. 445 _ NFSSD's Mot. S.J. and NFSSD's Mot. to Strike, Hearing Transcript (June 8, 
2011), attached hereto as Addendum "D." The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and an order granting 
summary judgment in favor of NFSSD. R. 406-13, and Addendum "B" to Appellant's 
Brief (March 13, 2012). The trial court also granted NFSSD's Motion to Strike. R. 414-
421, attached hereto as Addendum "E" - Order on NFSSD's Mot. to Strike. See also R. 
445. Bennion filed a notice of appeal with the trial court on November 10, 2011. R. 440-
41. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
NFSSD is a special service district duly organized and authorized pursuant to Utah 
State Law. R. 207 and R. 261. All property owners located within the boundaries of 
NFSSD are required to pay a monthly base fee for access to water, fire protection, and 
garbage collection services provided by NFSSD. R. 188,194,206, 412. Such fees have 
been established by NFSSD's board of directors ("the Board"), and the Board has 
established additional fees and penalties if a North Fork member fails to timely pay the 
fees established and imposed by NFSSD, e.g. interest at the rate of 12% per annum on 
delinquent accounts. R. 188, 194, 206, 412. Moreover, NFSSD is authorized to charge 
an excess water usage fee to the members who use more than 5,000 gallons during one 
month. R. 188, 194, 206, 412. The amount NFSSD charges property owners for excess 
water usage is based on a graduated scale adopted by the Board. R. 188, 194, 206,412. 
At all times relevant to this action, Bennion was the record property owner of real 
property located at 9403 Canopy Lane, Utah County, State of Utah (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Bennion property" or "the Property"). R. 5-6, 19, 194. Bennion's property 
falls within the North Fork Special Service District jurisdiction and boundaries. R. 5-6, 
19, 194. 
NFSSD continuously provided the Bennion property with water, garbage 
collection, and fire protection services for several years, including at all times relevant to 
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this case, and invoice statements were customarily and routinely sent on a quarterly basis 
toBennion. R. 188, 193-94, 206, 412. 
Bennion's appellate brief contains three pages labeled "Factual Background"1 that 
are completely irrelevant to this case. Appellant's Brief, 5-7. Fourth district court 
decisions have determined time and time again that the matters asserted in Appellant's 
Brief regarding the history of water in the North Fork district, Pamela Vincent, and 
Robert Redford have already been litigated or are simply not relevant. R. 177-83, 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for prior collection case) attached hereto as 
Addendum "F," and R. 445. See also Addendum "G" - Fourth District Court decisions 
regarding Bennion v. Pamela Vincent and/or NFSSD. 
The case before the Court is merely a simple action to collect for past due service 
fees and is not related whatsoever to Bennion's claims of Robert Redford's alleged 
promises to Utah County, bond funds for a culinary water system, or other connections to 
water lines within NFSSD's water delivery system. R. 1-6, 194, 205. 
Over the course of several years, Bennion refused to pay for any service fees to 
NFSSD. R. 177-83,193,205, 208,257-58. NFSSD previously filed suit against 
Bennion for unpaid base service fees as well as over-usage fees, together with interest 
1
 Bennion asserts these statements as a "Factual Background" because they were 
provided to the trial court. However, these "facts" were provided merely as an 
introduction to a pleading in the trial court, and not actually asserted as facts supported by 
evidence. R. 77-80. 
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and penalties. R. 208. That case was titled North Fork Special Service District v. 
Bennion, Fourth Judicial District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah, Case No. 
040401235 (hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 040401235"). R. 208. See also 
Addendum "F." 
At a hearing held on November 10, 2005 (Order entered on January 24, 2006), 
regarding Case No. 040401235, the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott ("Judge Stott") 
granted NFSSD's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Bennion for base user 
fees incurred by Bennion from January 1, 1997 through January 1, 2002, in the amount of 
$3,524.31, which represented $2,038.00 for outstanding base user fees and $1,486.31 in 
accrued interest. R. 207-08. The remaining issues for trial in Case No. 040401235 were 
(1) whether or not Bennion was responsible for the excess water usage along a lateral 
water line servicing the Bennion property, and (2) whether NFSSD was entitled to 
attorney fees associated with prosecuting the matter. R. 207. 
A trial was held on October 10, 2008, to determine the remaining issues of Case 
No. 040401235. R. 207. Judge Stott found Bennion was responsible for not only the 
base user fees, but also the excess water usage fees during the time in question. R. 177-
83. Judge Stott granted judgment against Bennion in the amount of $ 11,706.98 for 
excess water usage fees, plus interest and attorney fees. R. 177-83. 
6 
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The case now before this Court has the same factual basis as Case No. 040401235, 
except the compensation for which Plaintiff seeks unpaid user fees covers a different 
period of time. R. 207. 
Bennion claims that in 1998, he "shut off the valve where the water enters his 
home." Appellant's Brief, 7. However, he fails to mention that this issue was before the 
Fourth District Court, and at the bench trial, Judge Stott heard evidence that there are 
other users in the North Fork district that would be materially affected if Bennion were to 
shut off his water, and Pamela Vincent had previously obtained a TRO because 
Bennion mechanically altered the connections in a junction box located 
where the residential water line servicing Pamela Vincent and Robert 
Bennion's homes branch from the main water line so as to shut off all 
the water along the road on which the parties' live.. .Pamela Vincent 
filed a complaint and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order 
enjoining Robert Bennion from interfering with the delivery of water. 
See Addendum "G," p. 2, §§5-6. 
NFSSD is responsible for the maintenance of the main water lines of its water 
delivery system. R. 182, 188, 411. NFSSD is not responsible for maintenance of lateral 
water lines that connect to the main water lines of NFSSD's water delivery system. R. 
182,188,411. Rather, individual property owners are responsible for the maintenance of 
lateral water lines servicing their properties. R. 182, 188, 411. Prior to November 1997 
through March 31, 2009, Bennion has been the owner of the lateral water line from the 
point it connects to the NFSSD's main water line at a meter box located north of the 
Bennion property to the meter box south of the Bennion property that is located on a 
7 
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property adjacent to the Bennion property (hereinafter referred to as "the Bennion Lateral 
Water Line'5). R. 179, 181-82, 187,410-11. Bennion is responsible for water taken out 
of the Bennion Lateral Water Line regardless of whether or not he personally utilizes 
such water or whether the water is lost through leaks located in the Bennion Lateral 
Water Line. R. 181, 187, 410. This determination was made by the trial court because of 
the testimony presented at trial (in Case No. 040401235) that Bennion prohibited NFSSD 
from placing a meter on the Bennion Lateral Water Line that would have more accurately 
determined how much water was actually used by Bennion. R. 180-81. 
Bennion continuously refused to allow NFSSD's employees or agents on the 
Bennion property to fix and service the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 187, 410, 445. 
The leaks that may have contributed to the excess water usage through the Bennion 
Lateral Water Line were remedied only after NFSSD obtained injunctive relief to enter 
the Bennion property to fix and service the water delivery system. R. 187, 410. The 
reason NFSSD was forced to obtain injunctive relief was due to threats - including 
threats of violence - made by Bennion against NFSSD's representatives who were trying 
to address the problem. R. 187, 410, 445 (9:15-20). 
Bennion continues to argue moot points through his unmerited litigation. 
Bennion's actions and continued litigation have been pursued in bad faith, resulting in 
Plaintiff incurring extensive legal fees to pursue its legal rights. R. 178-80, 186, 192, 
408-08,445. 
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As stated previously, this is a simple case for collection of fees. Between 
February 28, 2004 and March 31, 2009, approximately 14,700,268 gallons of water were 
taken out of NFSSD's water system by way of the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 186-
87, 410. This is based on meter readings taken between the between the two points of the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 186-87, 410. Bennion is obligated to pay for his base 
user fees (access to water up to 5,000 gallons/month, fire protection, and sanitation 
services), as well as interest. R. 193, 410-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINTI. 
The trial court's ruling to not limit the amount of damages that NFSSD can collect to 
$200 a month should be upheld for two reasons. First, Bennion has incorrectly 
interpreted §17B-2-804 (2004) to limit the amount of fees NFSSD can collect to $200 a 
month. The correct interpretation of § 17B-2-804 is that a service district is allowed to 
recover all of the delinquent user fees when it brings a civil action for the collection of 
those fees and is limited to $200 in the amount it can recover in collection fees when the 
suit is brought for services provided to a residential property. Second, Bennion failed to 
properly preserve for appeal the issue of the $200 limitation under § 17B-2-804. 
Specifically, Bennion did not raise this issue in a manner that would give the trial court 
an opportunity to rule on the issue. Based on these two reasons, the trial court's decision 
in regards to the monetary judgment awarded to NFSSD should be upheld. 
9 
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POINT II. 
Bennion asserts he is not liable for excess water fees from September 22, 2006 - the date 
NFSSD obtained an Order of Immediate Occupancy - through October 2007. This is a 
question of fact and law. However, Bennion did not properly marshal the evidence 
related to this issue. Moreover, NFSSD is not responsible for water taken out of the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line, despite the Order of Immediate Occupancy. The leaks in 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line were well documented before NFSSD ever acquired the 
right to enter Bennion's Property, and that right did not cause "damages" to Bennion's 
Property. Rather, Bennion is obligated to pay for any excess water fees associated with 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
POINT III. 
Bennion's repeated pursuit of irrelevant and unmerited claims that involve third parties or 
that are not related to the simple matter of collection for fees, and his refusal to ever pay 
for any user fees required NFSSD to engage in protracted litigation. Bennion's continued 
attempts at relitigating issues have been pursued in bad faith, and the trial court's 
decision to award NFSSD's attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825 was 
correct. 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO NOT LIMIT NFSSD'S USER FEES TO 
TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH SHOULD BE UPHELD AS §17B-2-804 
DOES NOT LIMIT NFSSD'S USER FEES TO TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS A 
MONTH AND BECAUSE BENNION FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL. 
A. Section 17B-2-804(3)(b), Utah Code Annotated, Does Not Limit the Amount 
that Special Service District's Can Recover in a Civil Action to Two Hundred 
Dollars. 
Special service districts are allowed to collect more than a total of two hundred 
dollars ($200.00) when they bring a lawsuit for the collection of unpaid user fees. 
Bennion argues that under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) (2004), a special service 
district is prohibited from collecting more than $200 a month from a service user 
regardless of how much the user owes in delinquent service fees. This argument is 
contrary to the intent of the statute and common sense principles. The following 
information shows that the language of §17B-2-804(3)(b) is ambiguous, but when the 
statute is read in conjunction with other portions of the Code and the intent of the statute, 
it is clear that a service district may bring a civil action to collect the full amount of user 
fees it is owed plus an additional $200.00 for collection costs. 
1. Certain Language in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is Ambiguous. 
Section 17B-2-804(b) is ambiguous as the language in certain portions of the 
statute are subject to multiple interpretations. A statute is deemed to be ambiguous if it is 
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susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Marion Energy, Inc., v. KFJ 
Ranch Partn., 267 P.3d 863, 866-67 (Utah 2011). In the present matter, the $200 
limitation set forth in § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is interpreted differently by NFSSD and 
Bennion. The portion of Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804(3) that is ambiguous reads as 
follows: 
(3) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the 
customer fails to pay the past due service fees amd collection costs within 
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice 
under Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (3), a customer is liable to the 
local district for an amount that: 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court 
costs, a reasonable attorney fee, and damages; and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $200. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of 
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or 
any combination of them. 
(c) If a local district files a civil action under this Subsection (3) before 31 
calendar days after the day on which the local district mailed notice under 
Subsection (l)(b), a customer may not be held liable for an amount in 
excess of past due service fees. 
(d) A local district may not file a civil action under this Subsection (3) 
unless the customer has failed to pay the past due service fees and 
collection costs within 30 days from the day on which the local district 
mailed notice under Subsection (l)(b). 
The correct interpretation of the $200 limitation language in §17B-2-804(3)(b) is 
that it limits the collection costs that a service district can collect in a civil suit to $200. 
12 
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Bennion interprets the statutory language differently. Bennion currently interprets the 
statute to limit a service district's total judgment to $200 a month if it brings a civil action 
to recover delinquent service fees. This interpretation by Bennion differs from his own 
previous interpretation of the statute. In documents filed with the trial court2, Bennion 
interpreted the $200 provision to limit a service district's total judgment to $200 in a civil 
suit for the collection of fees. R. 72-75. Bennion seems to now recognize that such an 
interpretation is untenable and has modified his interpretation to something that he 
believes will be more palatable to the Court. The fallacies with both of Bennion's 
interpretations will be addressed later. The point at this time is that the specific language 
of the statute is subject to different interpretations. Accordingly, the language of the 
statute is ambiguous and other factors must be considered to determine the meaning of 
the statute. 
2. The Language Contained in the Statutes Related to Utah Code Ann. 
§17B-2-804, Provides that in a Civil Suit a Service District is Not 
Limited to Collecting $200 in Delinquent User Fees. 
As the language in Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 (2004) relating to the $200 
limitation, if read in isolation, is ambiguous, the Court is able to look at related statutes to 
determine the meaning of specific provisions in §17B-2-804. In State v. Schofield, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that when interpreting statutes, 
2
 As is stated in this brief, the pleadings filed by Bennion that reference the $200 limit 
and Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 were never properly placed before the Court and did 
not preserve the issue for appeal. 
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the plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions 
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with 
other statutes under the same and related chapters. 63 P.3d 667, 669-70 
(Utah 2002) (further citations omitted). 
When the language in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is read in connection with the 
other provisions of the chapter, it is clear that the $200 limitation applies to collection 
costs and not delinquent user fees. 
Section 17B-2-801 et seq. of Utah Code Ann. was created to establish procedures 
for the collection of delinquent water and sewer service fees. Section 17B-2-802, inter 
alia, gives a service district the authority to terminate water and sewer services if a user is 
delinquent in his user fee payments. Specifically, subsection of (l)(b) of Section 802 
states that if a user fails to pay for services provided, then the service district can stop 
providing the service "until all amounts for water furnished or sewer service provided, 
respectively, are paid " Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-802(l)(b). Similarly, Utah Code 
Ann. §17B-2-803 (2004) gives a service district the ability to place a lien on a property 
until all of the delinquent user fees are collected. Subsection (5) of section 803 indicates 
that a service district does not have to release its lien until it is paid all it is owed in 
delinquent user fees that necessitated the lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-803(5). 
Neither sections 802 or 803 limit in any way, much less to $200 a month, the amount of 
delinquent user fees that a service district can collect. In fact, both sections provide 
specifically that the service district may continue the identified collection tool until all 
delinquent user fees are paid. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2-804 (2004), upon which Bennion relies, is a continuation 
of sections 802 and 803 in that it provides another avenue for service districts to collect 
delinquent user fees, which avenue is to file a civil lawsuit. When section 804 is read in 
connection with the other sections of the chapter, it is clear that the $200 limitation 
applies only to collection fees and not delinquent user fees. If we were to accept 
Bennion's interpretation of the $200 limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-
804(3)(b), then a service district could turn off a user's services until the sendee district 
was paid all delinquent user fees. The service district could also place a lien on the 
property until all delinquent water fees were paid. But, if the service district filed a 
lawsuit to collect delinquent water fees, then it could only collect $200 total or $200 a 
month, depending upon which of Bennion's interpretations is applied. Both 
interpretations by Bennion are illogical. It makes no sense that a service district can 
collect all delinquent user fees if it terminates services or files a lien, but it is limited in 
the service fees it can collect if it files a lawsuit. 
Conversely, NFSSD's interpretation, that a service district which files a lawsuit to 
collect delinquent user fees may collect all of the delinquent user fees and is only limited 
in the amount of collection costs it can recover, is in complete harmony with the other 
statutes providing means for a service district to collect delinquent user fees. NFSSD's 
interpretation of the $200 limitation is consistent with related statutes and as such it is the 
correct interpretation of the statute. 
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3. The Other Provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 Show that 
Service Districts That File a Civil Lawsuit Are Not Limited to $200 a 
Month in the Collection of Delinquent User Fees. 
Not only is NFSSD's interpretation of the $200 limitation set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §17B-2-804(3)(b) consistent with related statutes, such interpretation is in harmony 
with the other language in section 804. As set forth in the previously referenced case 
law, when interpreting a particular provision of a statute, courts should consider the 
statute as a whole, i.e. provisions of a statute should be interpreted so that they are 
consistent with each other and do not create illogical or contradictory interpretations. 
The other provisions of section 804 support NFSSD's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) 
that filing a civil lawsuit does not limit the amount of delinquent user fees that a service 
district can collect in a suit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) provides three steps for a service district to 
follow in the collection of delinquent fees. The first step identified in subsection (1) is 
for the service district to mail notice of the delinquent fees to the user. The second step 
set forth in subsection (2) is for the service district to send a letter to the user stating that 
it will not file a civil lawsuit if the user pays the delinquent service fees plus collection 
costs, pre-litigation damages, and $50 in attorney's fees. This section provides a $100 
limit for residential property. The third step, which is identified in subsection (3), is for 
the service district to file a lawsuit. Subsection (3)(b) provides a limit of $200 for 
residential property. Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004). 
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If we were to accept Bennion's interpretation of subsection (2), then the most the 
service district could collect in delinquent user fees, interest, attorney's fees, collection 
costs, and damages would be $100. This interpretation is contrary to common sense and 
is impractical. Service fees for water and sewer are regularly over $100 a month. Under 
the statute, a service district cannot even send the letter asking for payment until 30 days 
after it has sent notice of the delinquent fees. If Bennion's interpretation of subsection 
(2) were accurate, then a water user could use as much water as he wanted over a 
multiple month period and only have to pay $100 to avoid a lawsuit regardless of the 
amount he owed in delinquent user fees. This $100 would also include the $50 fee the 
service district is able to charge for its attorney. Thus, under Bennion's interpretation of 
subsection (2), a water user could receive several months of water service for a total $50. 
This interpretation by Bennion of subsection (2) is obviously flawed and contrary 
to common sense principles. Whereas, NFSSD's interpretation that the $100 limitation 
referenced in subsection (2) relates only to collection costs is in harmony with common 
sense and the other provisions of the statute. As the proper interpretation of subsection 
(2) of section 804 is that the $100 limitation applies to collection costs and not delinquent 
user fees, then NFSSD's interpretation that the $200 limitation in subsection (3)(b) 
applies only to collection costs is in harmony with subsection (2). 
Additionally, the three steps outlined in section 804 show that the statute is 
designed to give the user an opportunity and a motivation to pay the delinquent user fees 
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before a lawsuit is filed. If Bennion's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) were accepted, 
there would be no motivation for a user to settle prior to a lawsuit. This is because under 
Bennion's interpretation, if a user paid after receiving the notice, he would have to pay 
the entire delinquent amount. But, if the user waited to pay until he received the 30 day 
letter, the maximum he would have to pay is $100 even if his delinquent user fees were 
well over $100. And, if the user waited until a lawsuit was filed, the maximum he would 
have to pay is $200. Under this interpretation by Bennion, a service district would have 
no motivation for filing a lawsuit as the filing fee alone would be more than $200. 
Obviously, Bennion's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) is inconsistent with the 
three steps outlined in section 804. Whereas, NFSSD's interpretation that the $200 
limitation applies only to collection costs is in-step with the other provisions of section 
804. Accordingly, NFSSD's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) is the correct 
interpretation. 
4. The Intent and Purpose of Title 17B, Chapter 2, Part 8, Was to Allow a 
Service District to Collect All Delinquent User Fees. 
Part 8 of Title 17B, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann., was intended to provide a means 
whereby service districts could collect user fees from the parties who incurred the user 
fees. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary 
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 52 
P.3d 1276, 1278 (Utah 2002) (further citations omitted). As stated previously, Part 8 
provides three different avenues for a service district to collect fees: (1) terminate 
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services, (2) file a lien, and (3) file a civil lawsuit. All three of these avenues are 
designed to assist service districts in the collection of delinquent user fees. This is 
evidenced by the title of Part 8, which is "Collection of Water and Service Fees." Thus, 
the language and the procedures of the statute clearly show that the intent of the statute 
was to help in the collection of delinquent service fees not to limit the collection to $200. 
Furthermore, the Utah legislative history associated with Part 8 shows that the 
$200 limitation was to apply to collection costs not the delinquent user fees. The 
following is an excerpt from the legislative hearing leading up to the adoption of section 
804: 
For the discussion, Rep Clark. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. 
I wonder if the sponsor of the amendment would answer a question. 
Rep Murray will you yield? 
-Yes 
Proceed 
I need a little clarification. This particular section of the bill deals with, not 
the amount of service that's past due, but it says with the appropriate court 
costs, attorney fees and other damages in the amount equal to the greater of 
$100 or triple the amount, the past due amount, not to exceed $200. I'm not 
sure that this deals with the service aspect of it, but this deals with what's 
available to the district for collecting. Do you have an opinion on that? 
- Well it wouldn't cover the entire thing, but it would be closer than $200 -
would. 
Ok well thank you, I stand against[?] this particular amendment and let me 
tell you why. I appreciate what the sponsor of the bill has done to try and 
improve the content of this bill. But what we do with the water district right 
now is that we allow that water to have a special position when it comes to 
the lien rights that are associated with this that we don't give to anybody 
else. We allow them, if the water is past due, they have the option of their 
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collection. They can shut off the water and the amount that's past due then 
can be certified as a tax lien on the property. So they have the ability of, 
rather than going to court and going through judicial process, they are given 
the special privilege of having that certified and a lien attached to the 
property. What this is saying is that those costs associated with that should 
not exceed $200. If they want to go to $500, I'm fine with that, but then 
they should be able to go back through and do the judicial process and not 
be treated separately or special in the certification of it. If they are able to 
certify that bill, all they need is the $200 to cover the cost of collection that 
is associated with it and not to get the attorney's fees any higher than that. I 
think there is a special dispensation given to these folks in this process and 
this is not needed and $200 is more than adequate to cover the costs of the 
special certification of the lien. 
Thank you, Mr. Clark 
House Hearing on HB 56 "Local Government Collection for Service Charges," Day 40, 
<http://www.le. state.ut.us/isp^ 
s^true>, (last updated February 16, 2004). 
This excerpt from the legislative hearing on this statute shows that the $200 limitation 
was not meant to apply to the delinquent user fees but only to the collection fees. 
Accordingly, Bennion's interpretation of the $200 limitation is incorrect and should be 
rejected. 
5. Summary of Argument that subsection (3)(b) of Utah Code Ann. §17B-
2-804 Does Not Limit the Amount of Service User Fees that NFSSD 
Can Collect from Bennion to $200. 
The above information shows that the specific language in subsection (3)(b) of 
Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 is ambiguous in regards to what collection amounts are 
limited to $200. However, a review of the statute as a whole and the purpose and intent 
of the statute makes clear that the $200 limitation referenced in subsection (3)(b) applies 
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only to collection costs and not delinquent user fees. Accordingly, the Court should 
uphold the trial court's ruling in regards to the amount of delinquent user fees Bennion 
owes NFSSD, including base user fees, excess water fees, and interest, as has been 
adopted by NFSSD's Board. 
B. Bennion's Appeal Seeking to Limit NFSSD's Judgment to $200 a Month 
Under Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 Should be Denied as Such Issue Was Not 
Properly Preserved for Appellate Review, 
Even assuming argumendo that the Court found Bennion's interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. §17B-2-804 (2004) was correct and that NFSSD was entitled to a judgment of 
no more than $200 a month for delinquent user fees, Bennion's appeal on this issue still 
should be denied as he failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal. To preserve an 
issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court "in such a way that the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 372-73 
(Utah 2007) (further citations omitted). There are three elements that must be satisfied 
for there to be a finding that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Those 
elements are "1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; 2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and 3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Id. If all three of these elements are not met, then an issue has not been 
preserved for appeal In the present matter, Bennion has failed to satisfy any of the three 
elements necessary to preserve for appeal the issue of limiting NFSSD's judgment to 
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$200 a month under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) for delinquent user fees during 
the relevant time period. 
1. Bennion Did Not Properly Raise the Issue of the $200 Limitation 
Pursuant to §17B-2-804 in a Timely Fashion. 
The information set forth in the next two sections will show that Bennion never 
properly raised the $200 limitation issue under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 at the trial 
court level. Accordingly, he failed to satisfy the first element necessary to preserve an 
issue for appeal, which is to timely raise the appealed issue. 
2. Bennion Did Not Specifically Bring Before the Trial Court the Issue 
Relating to the $200 Limitation Under §17B-2-804. 
At no to time did Bennion properly bring before the trial court the issue relating to 
the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804. Bennion claims in his Appellate 
Brief that he preserved this issue through both his Motion to Dismiss pleadings and 
Summary Judgment pleadings. Appellant's Brief, p. 2, § 1. However, a review of the 
pleadings on both of these motions show that Bennion failed to properly raise the issue of 
the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804. 
Bennion did not raise the issue of the §17B-2-804 limitation in his Motion to 
Dismiss. R. 21-27. He did not raise the issue in his Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 41-47. Bennion did raise the $200 limitation issue under Utah 
Code Ann. §17B-l-904 during oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss. R. 58, 81. But, 
he did not raise the issue under § 17B-2-804. R. 58. After oral arguments on the Motion 
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to Dismiss, the trial court allowed each party to file one supplemental brief on the $200 
limitation issue. R. 58. In his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of his Motion to 
Dismiss, Bennion only raised the issue of the $200 limitation in the context of § 17B-1-
904. R. 62-81. He did not raise the issue in the context of §17B-2-804. R. 62-81. 
Accordingly, the trial court made its order on the Motion to Dismiss under §17B-1-904, 
which is the statute Bennion presented to the trial court in his pleadings. R. 151-55. 
Bennion did raise the issue of the $200 limitation under §17B-2-804 in a Supplemental 
Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. R. 137-43. However, this 
pleading was not authorized or accepted by the trial court since the trial court ordered 
each party was allowed to submit one "final brief for supplemental briefing on 
Bennion's Motion to Dismiss. R. 58. The trial court makes no reference to this 
unauthorized pleading in its Decision on the Motion to Dismiss. R. 151-55. Thus, this 
unauthorized pleading did not bring the issue before the trial court as it was never 
considered by the court. 
As Bennion did not bring the issue of the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann. 
§17B-2-804 before the trial court through an authorized pleading, he did not give the trial 
court an opportunity to rule on that issue in the Motion to Dismiss proceedings. 
Therefore, he did not properly raise the issue in the Motion to Dismiss proceedings. 
Similarly, Bennion did not properly raise the issue of the $200 limitation under 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 in his Summary Judgment pleading. The only pleading 
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filed by Bennion in the summary judgment proceedings was his Memorandum in 
Opposition to NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 210-63. In his summary 
judgment opposition, Bennion did raise the $200 limitation under §17B-2-804. R. 246-
48. However, NFSSD filed a Motion to Strike portions of Bennion's Opposition 
including the portion relating to § 17B-2-804. R. 265-90. Moreover, at oral argument on 
NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, Bennion did not mention 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804. R. 445. The trial court granted NFSSD's Motion to Strike 
and did not consider §17B-2-804 in its summary judgment ruling. R. 396, 414-21. 
Bennion's appeal to this Court does not include an appeal of the trial court's order 
on the Motion to Strike. In order for a stricken pleading to be considered part of the 
record on appeal, the appealing party must specifically appeal the order striking the 
pleading. The Utah Court of Appeals made this point clear in its recent ruling in Maese 
v. Tooele County, 2012 UT App. 49, when it stated as follows: 
However, the IT affidavit was stricken from the record on foundational 
grounds, and Maese did not appeal that decision. Indeed, Maese 
acknowledged that the IT affidavit was stricken but nonetheless relies on it 
in its appellate brief without any attempt to argue that it should not have 
been stricken. Because the IT affidavit was stricken and Maese has not 
challenged the propriety of the trial court's decision to strike it, the IT 
affidavit is not properly on the record before us and we do not rely on it in 
our analysis. Id. at T[ 8. 
Thus, a party cannot rely on document that was stricken from the record on appeal if the 
party has not specifically appealed the order striking the document from the record. 
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Because Bennion's argument relating to Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 in his 
Opposition to Summary Judgment was stricken and because he did not appeal the order 
on the Motion to Strike, he failed to specifically raise the $200 limitation issue under 
§ 17B-2-804 in the summary judgment proceedings. 
As Bennion did not properly raise the § 17B-2-804 issue in the Motion to Dismiss 
proceedings, the Summary Judgment proceedings, or in any other proceedings in the trial 
court, he has failed to satisfy the second element necessary to preserve an issue for 
appeal, which is to specifically raise the issue to the trial court. 
3. Bennion Did Not Introduce Supporting Evidence or Relevant Legal 
Authority to the Trial Court Regarding the Alleged Limitation Under 
Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804. 
In order to satisfy the final element necessary to preserve an issue for appeal, a 
party must do more than mention an issue it must provide the trial court with evidence or 
law in support of the issue. In State v. Cruz, the court stated that "merely mentioning.. 
.an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.. .does not 
preserve that issue for appeal." 122 P.3d 543, 553 (Utah 2005) (further citations omitted). 
Bennion failed to provide the trial court with any evidence or legal authority for his 
theory that Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 limits the amount NFSSD can recover to $200. 
As set forth above, Bennion never put before the trial court in an acceptable form the 
issue of § 17B-2-804 limiting the amount owed to $200. Nor did he ever cite relevant 
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legal authority in a permissible manner for his position. Accordingly, Bennion failed to 
satisfy the third element necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. 
4. Summary of Bennion's Failure to Preserve for Appeal the Utah Code 
Ann. §17B-2-804 Issue. 
Bennion cannot raise the §17B-2-804 issue at this time because he has failed to 
satisfy any of the three required elements necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. He 
did not timely raise the issue to the trial court, he did not specifically raise the issue, and 
he did not provide the trial court with relevant legal authority. Therefore, Bennion failed 
to give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the §17B-2-804 issue and thus did not 
preserve the issue for appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT 
BENNION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EXCESS WATER USAGE FEES FROM 
SEPTEMBER 22, 2006 THROUGH OCTOBER 2007 BECAUSE BENNION 
FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, AND NFSSD IS NOT 
RESPONSIBLE FOR WATER TAKEN OUT OF THE BENNION LATERAL 
WATER LINE. 
Bennion claims that NFSSD is responsible for the excess water fees charged to 
Bennion after September 22, 2006.3 Appellant's Brief, 27. Bennion asserts that once 
NFSSD obtained an Order of Immediate Occupancy on September 22,2006, NFSSD had 
a duty to maintain the easement, and therefore, Bennion is not responsible for any excess 
3
 Bennion previously claims NFSSD had a right to enter the property on May 31, 2007 -
not September 22, 2006. R. 254. Moreover, the "Order of Immediate Occupancy" was 
issued by Judge Anthony W. Schofield on May 31, 2007, after which Bennion filed an 
appeal, which was denied on or about July 2,2007. R. 277. 
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water usage fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007. Id. at 27-28. 
However, the Court should affirm the trial court's order because Bennion failed to 
marshal the evidence, and Bennion is responsible for the excess water fees attributed to 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
A. Bennion Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence. 
Bennion's appeal should be denied because he failed to properly marshal the 
evidence. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). Furthermore, the marshaling duty requires 
a party to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." W. 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (UtahCt. App; 1991). If an 
appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court may assume the 
findings are correct or adequately supported by the record. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 
1177, 1181 (Utah 2004) (citing Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d228, 233 
(Utah 1998)). 
In the present case, Bennion asserts that he turned off the water to his property in 
1998. Appellant's Brief, 24. However, Bennion fails to mention that he is the owner of 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line, and he is responsible for water taken out of the Bennion 
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Lateral Water Line regardless of whether or not he personally utilizes the water or water 
is lost due to leaks along the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 1799 181, 187,410. 
Bennion acknowledges that he refused to allowr NFSSD's representatives onto the 
Property to service the lateral waterline line, but claims "that incident occurred well 
before the time period at issue in this case." Appellant's Brief, 24. This implies that 
Bennion would have allowed NFSSD agents on the Property during the time in question. 
However, Bennion fails to address that he opposed NFSSD's efforts to gain access to the 
Property to fix the lateral water line, and after Judge Schofield granted NFSSD's motion 
for an order of immediate occupancy, Bennion appealed such decision. R. 277, 445 
(9:17-20). Bennion has been uncooperative with NFSSD in remedying the assumed leaks 
along the Bennion Lateral Water Line, including making threats of violence toward 
NFSSD employees and/or agents in the past, which collectively played a role in NFSSD's 
decision to seek the immediate occupancy order. R. 187, 204, 272. 
In addition, Bennion asserts that "repairs to Mr. Bennion's lateral waterline 
occurred in October 2007, the last date that NFSSD charged Mr. Bennion for water 
overuse fees." Appellant's Brief, 25 (citing R. 173-75). However, this is incorrect, and 
does not take into account all the evidence surrounding the timing of the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy and repairs. First of all, the last water overuse charge was 
$14,215.82 and applied to overages "from May to October 2007." R. 173 (emphasis 
added). The Order of Immediate Occupancy issued on September 22,2006, clearly 
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contemplates that (1) NFSSD was not going to repair, but rather, replace the damaged 
water line, (2) the new pipe could not be installed before winter, and (3) only preliminary 
work would be done at the site. R. 226. See also Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, p. 3. 
More importantly, the Order of Immediate Occupancy makes no mention of absolving 
Bennion in any way of his obligation to pay for any of the water charges due to the 
"hundreds of gallons of water" lost each week through apparent leaks. R. 226. See also 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum C. 
Bennion has failed to properly marshal the evidence, and therefore, his appeal 
regarding the excess water usage fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007 
should be denied. 
B. Bennion is Responsible for Excess Water Usage Charges Related to the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
Despite the Order of Immediate Occupancy, Bennion is responsible for the excess 
water charges. Bennion cites Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933) and 
Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696 (Utah 1943) claiming that once NFSSD was granted 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy, as holder of an easement, NFSSD was responsible 
for any excess water usage fees after that point. Bennion cited Nielson, stating "[o]ne 
acquiring an easement and right to travel over the lands of another not only assumes the 
burden of maintenance of said right of way, but all other burdens incident to its use." 
Nielson, 141 P.2d at 702. Bennion also asserts that "[t]he landowner is not liable for 
damages caused by ordinary use of the land by him." Id. 
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Bennion fails to distinguish those cases from this case. First of all, those cases 
addressed damages to the dominant estate by the servient estate holder's use of the 
easement. In the present case, the alleged leaks to the Bennion Lateral Water Line were 
well established prior to NFSSD obtaining the Order of Immediate Occupancy. R. 180-
81. In addition, the excess water fees are not "damages," but rather "fees." Bennion does 
not assert NFSSD caused "damages" due to NFSSD's use of any easement. 
Moreover, Bennion has misapplied any duty for maintenance. The general rule 
regarding duties to maintain a servient estate where both parties benefit is: 
Joint use by the servient owner and the servitude beneficiary of 
improvements used in enjoyment of an easement or profit, or of the 
servient estate for the purpose authorized by the easement or profit, 
gives rise to an obligation to contribute jointly to the costs reasonably 
incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion of the servient 
estate or improvements used in common. 
Restatement (Third) of Property §4.13(3). See also Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Griffin, 255 P.3d 667 (Utah 2011) (finding that the cost of maintenance of a private road 
should be distributed between the dominant and servient tenements in proportion to their 
relative use of the road). 
In the present case, the Bennion Lateral Water Line is part of the water delivery 
system that services other properties located within NFSSD's boundaries. Appellant's 
Brief, 5-7. Even assuming arguendo that NFSSD had some duty of maintenance of the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line after the trial court issued the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, Bennion and other "downstream" users from Bennion's property would be 
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responsible for a proportionate share of any maintenance costs. However, as stated 
previously, the excess water fees are just that - fees. The amounts are not damages to 
Bennion5s property. Therefore, the Court should deny Bennion's claim that he is not 
responsible for excess water fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO 
AWARD NFSSD'S ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-
5-825. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's decision to award NFSSD its attorney 
fees in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825. The trial court has discretion to 
determine whether matters were filed without merit and not in good faith. "It is within 
the district court's discretion to determine whether matters were filed were filed without 
merit and not in good faith." In re Estate ofPahl, 252 P.3d 865, 866 (Utah Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Utah Dep 't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). "Furthermore, 'appellate deference is owed to the trial judge who actually 
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the litigation.'" Id. 
NFSSD has been forced to pursue litigation against Bennion for several years 
because Bennion simply refuses to pay any user fees, and he refused to allow NFSSD on 
his property to repair any leaks in the water line. R. 198, R. 445 (8:9-11). Bennion 
continues to make the same arguments that are not relevant and are moot. 
The Court should uphold the trial court's award of attorney fees in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, NFSSD respectfully requests that this Court deny Mr. 
Bennion's appeal in its entirety and affirm the rulings of the district court in their entirety. 
DATED this 12. day of April, 2012. 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
< * ^ 
KASEYL.WRIGI 
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U.CA 1953 § 17B-2-8G1, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-801 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-801 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities 
Chapter 2. Local Districts 
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees (Refs & Annos) 
§ 17B-2-801. Definitions 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Collection costs" means an amount, not to exceed $20, to reimburse a local district for expenses associated with its efforts 
to collect past due service fees from a customer. 
(2) "Customer" means the owner of real property to which a local district has furnished water or provided sewer service. 
(3) "Damages" means an amount equal to the greater of: 
(a) $100; and 
(b) triple the past due service fees. 
(4) "Default date" means the date on which payment for service fees becomes past due. 
(5) "Past due service fees" means service fees that on or after the default date have not been paid. 
(6) "Prelitigation damages" means an amount that is equal to the greater of: 
(a) $50; and 
(b) triple the past due service fees. 
(7) "Service fees" means the amount charged by a local district to a customer for water furnished or sewer service provided 
to the customer's property. 
Laws 2004, c. 316, § 7, eff. May 3,2004. 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
End of Document €; 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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U.CA 1953 § 17B-2-802, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-802 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-802 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities 
Chapter 2. Local Districts 
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Sendee Fees (Refs & Annos) 
§ 17B-2-802. Authority to require written application for water or sewer service and to terminate 
for failure to pay—limitations 
(1) A local district that owns or controls a system for furnishing water or providing sewer service may: 
(a) before furnishing water or providing sewer service to a property, require the property owner or an authorized agent to 
submit a written application, signed by the owner or an authorized agent, agreeing to pay for all water furnished or sewer 
service provided to the property, whether occupied by the owner or by a tenant or other occupant, according to the rules and 
regulations adopted by the local district; and 
(b) if a customer fails to pay for water furnished or sewer service provided to the customer's property, discontinue furnishing 
water or providing sewer service to the property, respectively, until all amounts for water furnished or sewer service provided, 
respectively, are paid, subject to Subsection (2). 
(2) Unless a valid lien has been established as provided in Section 17B-2-803, has not been satisfied, and has not been terminated 
by a sale as provided in Subsection 17B-2-803(2), a local district may not: 
(a) use a customer's failure to pay for water furnished or sewer service provided to the customer's property as a basis for 
not furnishing water or providing sewer service to the property after ownership of the property is transferred to a subsequent 
owner; or 
(b) require an owner to pay for water that was furnished or sewer service that was provided to the property before the owner's 
ownership. 
Laws 2004, c. 316, § 8, eff. May 3, 2004. 
fflSTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 2003, c. 161, §§3, 4. 
C. 1953, §§ 10-7-10,10-7-11,17A-M03,17B-2-103. 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
End of Document © 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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U.CA 1953 § 17B-2-8G3, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-803 
U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-803 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities 
Chapter 2. Local Districts 
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees (Refs & Annos) 
§ 17B-2-803. Lien for past due fees for water or sewer service—Limitations 
(l)(a) A local district may certify past due service fees and other amounts for which the customer is liable under this chapter 
to the treasurer or assessor of the county in which the customer's property is located. 
(b) Subject to Subsection (2), the past due service fees and other amounts for which the customer is liable under this chapter, 
upon their certification under Subsection (l)(a), become a lien on the customer's property to which the water was furnished 
or sewer service provided, on a parity with and collectible at the same time and in the same manner as general county taxes 
that are a lien on the property. 
(2) A lien under Subsection (1) is not valid if certification under Subsection (1) is made after the filing for record of a document 
conveying title of the customer's property to a new owner. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed to: 
(a) waive or release the customer's obligation to pay service fees; 
(b) preclude the certification of a lien under Subsection (1) with respect to past due service fees for water furnished or sewer 
service provided after the date that title to the property is transferred to a new owner; or 
(c) nullify or terminate a valid lien. 
(4) After all amounts owing under a lien established as provided in this section have been paid, the local district shall file for 
record in the county recorder's office a release of the lien. 
Laws 2004, c. 316, § 9, eff. May 3,2004. 
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
End of Document Q 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Westlaw 
REST 3d PROP-SERV § 4.13 Page 1 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.13 (2000) 
c 
Restatement of the Law — Property 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
Current through June 2011 
Copyright © 2000-2012 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 4. Interpretation Of Servitudes 
§ 4.13 Duties Of Repair And Maintenance 
Link to Case Citations 
Unless the terms of a servitude determined under § 4.1 provide otherwise, duties to repair and maintain the 
servient estate and the improvements used in the enjoyment of a servitude are as follows: 
(1) The beneficiary of an easement or profit has a duty to the holder of the servient estate to repair and 
maintain the portions of the servient estate and the improvements used in the enjoyment of the servitude that 
are under the beneficiary's control, to the extent necessary to 
(a) prevent unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate, or 
(b) avoid liability of the servient-estate owner to third parties. 
(2) Except as required by § 4.9, the holder of the servient estate has no duty to the beneficiary of an ease-
ment or profit to repair or maintain the servient estate or the improvements used in the enjoyment of the 
easement or profit. 
(3) Joint use by the servient owner and the servitude beneficiary of improvements used in enjoyment of an 
easement or profit, or of the servient estate for the purpose authorized by the easement or profit, gives rise to 
an obligation to contribute jointly to the costs reasonably incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion 
of the servient estate or improvements used in common. 
(4) The holders of separate easements or profits who use the same improvements or portion of the servient 
estate in the enjoyment of their servitudes have a duty to each other to contribute to the reasonable costs of 
repair and maintenance of the improvements or portion of the servient estate. 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE DIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 080400633 DC 
Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Date: August 25, 2008 
Clerk: krisv 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): KASEY L WRIGHT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLAIRE SUMMERHILL 
Audio 
Tape Number: 08-24 203 Tape Count: 11:05 11:19 
HEARING 
TAPE: 08-24 203 COUNT: 11:05 11:19 
This matter comes before the court for oral arguments. Court 
addresses counsel. Ms. Summerhill responds to the court. Mr. 
Wright responds. Court states the 3rd cause will be dismissed. 
Ms. Summerhill continues. Mr. Wright responds. 
Court will allow Ms. Summerhill 10 days to submit a final brief 
and will also give Mr. Wright 10 day to submit his final brief. 
Court will take the other matter under advisement. Ms. Summerhill 
will prepare the order for the dismissal of Jch&. 3rd action. 
Dated this 3 ^ _ day of (DuJUy^^ ,r^2jfc 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Mf Date: September 25, 2008 
Case No. 080400633 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
The matter before the court is Defendant Robert Bennion's ("Defendant") motion to • 
dismiss, which was filed on May 27, 2008. Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District 
("Plaintiff) filed its opposition on June 18, 2008. Defendant filed his reply on July 2, 2008, 
along with a request to submit for decision and oral arguments. The court heard oral arguments 
on the motion on August 25, 2008. The court rendered a partial decision, concluding that 
Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages should be dismissed since no tort was alleged or pleaded 
and that a four-year statute of limitations applies. However, the court took two issues under 
advisement, namely whether payment of a court-awarded judgment tolled the statute of 
limitations and whether section 17B-1-904 of the Utah Code, which caps damages for service 
fees to $200 for a residential property, is applicable in this case since it became operative on May 
5, 2008. 
In its supplemental memorandum, Plaintiff concedes that the four-year statute of 
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limitations was not tolled by Defendant's payment of the court-awarded judgment and that any 
claims accruing prior to February 29, 2004 are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. In 
addition, both parties requested attorney fees in their supplemental memoranda in connection 
with litigating the motion to dismiss. As a result of the supplemental briefing, the issues before 
the court are whether section 17B-1-904 applies to limit Plaintiffs damages for service fees to 
$200 and whether either party should be awarded attorney fees. The court now renders this 
decision and concludes that section 17B-1-904 does not apply to limit Plaintiffs damages to 
$200. Additionally, the court declines to award attorney fees to either party. 
As noted by Plaintiff, section 68-3-3 of the Utah Code codifies the principle that statutes 
are not applicable retroactively unless the legislature clearly expresses that intention. Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-3 (2008). The Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]he best evidence of the 
legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the statute." Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of the 
Utah State Tax Comm % 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). In determining 
whether a particular statute was to be applied retroactively, the court stated that because the 
statute "contained] no language reflecting an intent that this subsection should apply 
retroactively, we conclude that the legislature had no such intent.'' Id. - -
Similarly, the plain language of section 17D-1-106, which made section 17B-1-904 
applicable to special service districts as of May 5, 2008, does not contain any language reflecting 
an intent on the part of the legislature that it should apply retroactively. Although, as noted by 
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Defendant, section 17B-1-904 was enacted in 2004, it did not apply to special service districts 
until May 5, 2008 when section 17D-1-106 was enacted, which was approximately two months 
after the case was filed by Plaintiff. In the absence of language in the statute showing an intent 
on the part of the legislature that section 17D-1-106 should apply retroactively to make 17B-1-
904 and other sections applicable to special service districts, the court declines to apply it 
retroactively to cap Plaintiffs service fee damages to $200. 
Because section 17B-1-904 of the Utah Code is not applicable retroactively, the court 
finds that section 17A-2-1320 applies in this case. Section 17A-2-1320, which was repealed 
May 5,2008 when 17B-1-904 became effective, authorized a special service district to pass a 
resolution or ordinance imposing fees or charges for services provided by the district. Utah Code 
Ann. § 17A-2-1320(l)(a) (2007) (repealed 2008). In addition, it enabled a district to adopt rules 
to assure the proper collection of all fees and charges, as well as allowing for the assessment and 
collection of penalties and interest if fees were not paid. Id. at § 17A-2-1320(2)(a) and (b). 
Although section 17A-2-1320 was repealed and replaced by 17B-1-904, section 68-3-5 of 
the Utah Code operates to preserve any right accrued by Plaintiff pursuant to section 17A-2-
1320. Section 68-3-5 states, "The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously 
repealed, or affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any 
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed." Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-5 (2008). Because the fees and charges imposed by Plaintiff on Defendant were already 
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accrued by the time the statute was repealed, section 68-3-5 works to make section 17A-2-1320 
applicable in this case. 
Both parties requested attorney fees in connection with bringing this motion. The court 
declines to award attorney fees to either party. 
In conclusion, the court finds that section 17B-1-904 is not made applicable retroactively 
by section 17D-1-106 and that section 17A-2-1320 is therefore applicable in this case. Plaintiff 
has stipulated that the four-year statute of limitations was not tolled by Defendant paying the 
judgment imposed by the court in a prior case. The court declines to award attorney fees to either 
party in connection with this motion. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare appropriate proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent with this decision for signature by 
the Court. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. 
4 MS. MELLOR: Good morning, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay,. Let me call the case. 
6 It's North Fork Special Service District vs Robert 
7 B e n n i o n . 
8 Those who are going to appear and 
9 participate please state your names for the record, 
10 please. 
11 MS. MELLOR: Melissa Mellor on behalf of 
12 the plaintiff, North Fork Special Service District. 
13 MR. BENNION: Robert Bennion on behalf of 
14 himself. 
15 THE COURT: Okay,, The matters before the 
16 Court this morning are pending motions. The 
17 plaintiff has filed a motion to strike the responses 
18 and the affidavits in support of the plaintiff's 
19 motion for summary judgment •• - excuse me, in support 
20 of the defendant's response to the plaintiff's motion 
21 for summary judgment. 
22 MS. MELLOR: That's correct. 
23 THE COURT: So we have those two motions 
24 before the Court today. 
25 And so go ahead, Ms. Mellor, you may 
CitiCourt, LLC Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 
proceed. 
MS. MELLOR: Thank you. I believe the 
motion to strike that's been filed on behalf of the 
plaintiff details specifically which portions we're 
seeking to strike. The reason that we're doing that 
is we find that they're either not relevant, they're 
based on inadmissible hearsay, they're not properly 
cited to in the defendant's opposition memorandum. 
For example, many of the responses to the plaintiff's 
asserted facts just contain argument and they don't 
have any relevant cite. They're not cited to even an 
affidavit or anything like that. And so in our 
memorandum in support of our motion to strike those 
portions, we detailed which ones specifically we 
would be seeking to strike, and that would be the 
basi s for that. ' 
We're also seeking to strike the 
defendant's affidavit that was filed in support of 
the defendant's opposition memo. The reason we're 
seeking to strike that is, one, it was dated from 
2005. Since that time, Your Honor, there's already 
been a collection case involving these same two 
parties for disputed fees and excess water fees prior 
to the dates in question in this case. And to allow 
that affidavit where it's merely restating something 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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5 
from a case that was completely adjudicated through a 
trial, we would seek to strike that on that basis. 
The other thing is that the defendant's 
opposition memorandum contains a purported, 
undisputed fact in their argument section as well as 
Exhibit F to their opposition memorandum. This is 
referencing Dr. Pamela Vincent, who was a former 
neighbor of Mr. Bennion's, a downhill water user. 
Just to provide some brief history, if the 
Court would like that. The prior court case, which 
went to trial, it was determined that the plaintiff 
is responsible for maintenance of main water lines. 
Just like most homeowners, they are then responsible 
for the lateral water lines and sewer lines that come 
off of that. You know, if something happens in the 
lateral water line at my house, I'm responsible for 
that. If it's the main line then, you know, the 
sewer company is going to take care of that. 
When we were at the prior trial, it was 
determined -- the Court, for sake of just making it 
more simple in reference, named it the Bennion 
lateral water line. And so you have this main water 
line and then coming off of that would be this 
Bennion lateral water line. There have been ongoing 
disputes about whether or not North Fork could even 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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6 
put meters on that or anything. 
Well, the downhill user from that was Dr. 
Vincent. Now, she was involved with a lawsuit prior 
to North Fork being involved in anything, and that 
predates even our prior collection case. That matter 
was resolved and the Court ruled in that case, from 
what I know, is that, yes, she's allowed to hook up 
to this water line. So the meters have been put in 
place coming off the main water meter and then where 
it goes to the Pamela Vincent property. 
Dr. Stott, in the prior trial, determined, 
well, any water that's used, whether or not it's 
being actually used or caused by leaks, is the 
responsibility of Mr. Bennion. And part of what came 
out at that trial was that he refused to allow North 
Fork to service this part of the water line. They 
were willing to do that in an effort to find any 
leaks and, you know, take care of any of that. 
So we're seeking to strike the information 
relating to Dr. Vincent because we don't believe it's 
relevant to this case, because this is really just a 
simple collection case for base user fees as well as 
the excess water usage fees. 
The last thing that we were seeking to 
strike is part of the argument in sections 1 and 2 of 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 the defendant's opposition memorandum, because it's 
2 our position that this was already adjudicated by 
3 this Court earlier on in this case. Where after the 
4 plaintiff had filed and served its complaint, the 
5 defendant filed a motion to dismiss and we briefed 
6 that, and there were even supplemental briefs 
7 associated with that. And then the decision was made 
8 regarding what statute of limitations and everything 
9 was applicable. So do.bring it up again in this --
10 you know, in the context of a motion for summary 
11 judgment we believe is inappropriate, and that's why 
12 that should be stricken. 
13 So those are the arguments as to why we 
14 want to strike those particular things. 
15 Regarding the plaintiff's motion for 
16 summary judgment, as has been said, you know, really 
17 we believe this is all subject to res judicata. This 
18 has been completely adjudicated. 
19 " One, is North Fork duly authorized to have 
20 a special service district? It's permitted by 
21 statute, we have adjudicated that issue as well 
22 previously. 
23 Are they allowed to charge base user fees? 
24 Yes, they're allowed by statute, also previously 
25 a d j u d i c a t e d . 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 Are they allowed to charge for excess 
2 water usage fees? Yes, they are. They set the 
3 schedule by the North-Forkboard of directors. 
4 Are they allowed to charge interest? Yes, 
5 they are. As a matter of law there are no genuine 
6 issues of material fact. North Fork is entitled to 
7 charge these amounts and they're entitled to collect 
8 on them. 
9 I mean, this has been ongoing for several 
10 years. Mr. Bennion holds the position that he 
11 doesn't need to pay for these. And it's the 
12 district's position that everyone needs to pay for 
13 these services. And they do provide water and sewer, 
14 garbage collection, and fire protection services. 
15 Those are included in the base fees. And then they 
16 have the graduated scale for the other fees, which 
17 have been provided in the pleadings. 
18 Now, I'm going to anticipate that there 
19 will be an argument that, well, we don't have to pay 
20 -- you know, he doesn't need to pay that much --
21 well, I'm assuming he doesn't believe he needs to pay 
22 for any, but even regarding the excess water fees. 
23 You know, there's been talk in these 
24 pleadings about how we sought injunctive relief, 
25 essentially, to gain access to this pipe because, 
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literally, millions of gallons of water were being 
lost and that's such a precious resource. And so 
that is what happened a few years ago. 
But where the actual order of immediate 
occupancy was granted, this was after we filed for 
this, then there was an appeal, then the rejection of 
the appeal, also a motion to reconsider was all 
involved in that. So by the time -- after we sought 
for the injunctive relief until we were able to get 
it was September 28th, 2007. 
Now, you would notice in the declaration 
of Mr. Boshard, who is the director of services for 
North Fork, in his -- I believe it is dated May 17th 
of last year, that you notice how these water fees 
were getting so large per quarter. Once we did 
obtain that injunctive relief, how it was going down 
dramatically, because North Fork was able to then go 
in, without possible threat by Mr. Bennion, because 
there had been prior threats, threats of violence, 
actually. And so once the Court order was in place 
and the appellate procedure regarding that to that 
point had been exhausted, they went in and did that 
and now it's -- you know, the pipe there, in 
question, isfunctioning. 
So based upon that, the plaintiff would 
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assert that, one, they're entitled to. charge these 
rates; that, two, Mr. Bennion is required to pay the 
base user fee, and that it's already been adjudicated 
that he's responsible for the excess water usage 
fees, and that he should be ordered to pay those as 
well, with interest, and that the Court also award 
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr.Bennion. 
MR. BENNION: First I'll address the issue 
of contracts, and I'll address the issue of fraud. 
And then, first of all, I'll have to address the 
issue of the duty of counsel to tell the truth. 
There is a duty of counsel to be forthright and 
forthcoming in front of the Court. 
This is a government agency. This is a 
government agency. The government agency has 
infinite money to harass anybody that they wish to 
harass, and they have done so. They have done so 
constantly. 
We start with the fact that in 1994 the 
North Fork Special Service District connected to my 
lateral without my permission. And there's definite 
-- there is an interesting bit of law that this 
counsel is ignoring. And the interesting bit of law 
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is nuisance per se. If she contends at any moment --
if she contends at any moment that the connection to 
Pamela Vincent was not a nuisance per se, she will be 
committing perjury. 
Now, there's specific laws about nuisance 
per se. Even if -- even if the work is done with 
absolute perfection and it doesn't meet the standards 
of law, even though it performs perfectly and it 
doesn't meet the standards of law, then it is a 
nuisance per se. 
The zoning ordinance requires for -- first 
of all, if this counsel denies that Pamela Vincent 
was in a recreational resort and had duties to the 
contract pertinent to the recreational resort, she 
will be lying, she will be committing perjury, and 
she will be obstructing justice. 
The water system -- the water system for 
recreational resorts require water mains in the 
culinary fire protection system supplying hydrants, 
dwellings, and any irrigation needs, shall be sized 
according to an engineering study to adequately 
supply those uses, but in no case shall they be less 
than six inches in diameter and no less than eight 
inches in diameter of supplying a fire hydrant on a 
dead-end run longer than 400 feet in length. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Now, if she contends for one moment that 
Pamela Vincent was being served, that my water line 
that was serving her was eight inches in diameter 
when it entered the recreational resort property, 
then she will be lying, she will be committing 
perjury. 
She has not been forthcoming. She has 
been gaining -- she has been gaining money for 
harassing me, for stealing my property, and 
destroying it as evidence. She has not -- neither 
she, or the water district, or Pamela Vincent ever 
paid me for my water line, never offered to pay me 
for my water line. And it was illegal for Pamela 
Vi ncent to use it. 
Pamela Vincent -- Pamela Vincent is in a 
recreational resort. The people in a recreational 
resort have to sign a contract that they'll obey the 
maintenance and preservation agreement. 
Now, the interesting part of the 
maintenance and preservation agreement is --
MS. MELLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to 
object, it's -- this --
MR. BENNION: I object. 
You stop. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Let her finish 
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her objection. 
MS. MELLOR: I'm going to object, this is 
beyond the scope. One, it's beyond the scope of what 
the two motions before the Court are. Two, this 
matter has already been adjudicated regarding hook up 
to Pamela Vincent in a lawsuit between Dr. Vincent 
and Mr. Bennion, that North Fork is not a part of. 
That's not the issue before the Court. 
MR. BENNION: The issue --
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BENNION: -- it's entirely resolved 
because this is a matter of fraud. This is a matter 
of fraud . 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BENNION: She contends that the North 
Fork Special Service District has been using a proper 
system to deliver me water. In reality, it was a 
nuisance per se and a dangerous nuisance in and of 
itself. At one point during their service I had a 
bathtub full of mud because of their construction. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The objection is 
overruled. 
You may continue. You have about ten 
minutes to go. Okay? 
MR. BENNION: Pamela Vincent -- and I read 
CitiCourt, LLC Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 this -- this is the contract that Pamela Vincent has 
2 to obey and it is a contract which the North Fork 
3 Special Service District agreed to. They had to 
4 agree to it. And it says --
5
 ; MS. MELLOR: Your Honor, I'm going to 
6 object, this isn't into evidence. I haven't seen 
7 this. I don't even -- I'm not sure what --
8 MR. BENNION: You have the obligation to 
9 know every bit of what has been going on. 
10 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
11 ; You may continue, Mr. Bennion, but I would 
12 just admonish you not to raise your voice --
13 MR. BENNION: Sorry. 
14 THE COURT: -- or make personal insults 
15 against the attorney. Okay? 
16 . MR. BENNION: Pamela Vincent is within a 
17 recreational resort. The North Fork Special Service 
18 District has been violating the law which does not 
19 allow public employees to give people special 
20 permission to violate the law. When, in the middle 
21 of January in 1995, they connected up to my water 
22 line without my permission, and in violation of the 
23 zoning ordinance and in violation of the covenants 
24 that Pamela Vincent signed when she went into the 
25 ordinance -- and she knows, she knows that there was 
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a contract, she knows that there was an ordinance, 
and she knows that they were in a subdivision. She 
has not been forthright to this Court that the North 
Fork Special Service District - -
Now, the other thing is -- the main other 
thing is is just yesterday -- well, the main thing is 
the developer -- the developer of the resort has to 
provide a water system. The North Fork Special 
Service District has been covering up the fact that 
Robert Redford did not, did not build a water system 
before he sold plat -- property in that plat. 
They're covering it up, they've been covering it up 
for 15 years. 
And they've sent me bills for water after 
I told them to stop using my water line. They could 
have run a hose or another pipeline all during this 
period. There was a water line from the North Fork 
Special Service District right in front of her house, 
about 50 feet away, and they could have attached a 
pump. But instead, they decided, with their heavy 
duty money, to use my line, which was a felony --
which was a felony and was also a violation of a 
nuisance per se including being an actual nuisance 
and a hazard to the people's health. 
All the time the water was leaking, any 
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public engineer would tell you, a water line that has 
leaks is highly hazardous for contamination. And I 
have mud in my bathtub because of their operation. 
And they never cleaned it out. And it's just -- it's 
just their willingness to spend a lot of public money 
to hide the fact that Pamela Vincent and the North --
and the Sundance Recreational Resort's plats D and B 
did not do their job. And they want to hide the fact 
that they were in violation of theft of my property. 
What they are doing -- what they were doing with my 
property is specified as theft by extortion. 
If they had water leaks, they shouldn't 
have had let them run for 15 years. They had any --
a water -- a plain water hose going down to Pamela 
Vincent would be more in conjecture with the law than 
using my water line. 
Now, somewhere here I have an envelope 
from the water district, which I have not opened, and 
it's similar to other notices. It's in 1995. And 
what it says there: If you don't pay your water 
bill, we're going to turn off your water line. Well, 
they -- at that point they had been using my water 
line to serve Pamela Vincent in a fraudulent 
recreational resort for two, three years. 
And I was perfectly willing for them to 
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shut off my water. Instead of shutting off my water 
and building a non leaking system, they forced water 
into the line. I told them several times to turn it 
off and do something different. They had another 
right-of-way which they could have easily used, but 
they chose to harass me for 15 years by using my 
water line and pretending that it was not a nuisance 
per se. It's abs-- and pretending that it wasn't 
felony theft by extortion to use my property for 
somebody else. 
THE COURT: You have five more minutes, 
sir. 
MR. BENNION: Thank you. I appreciate it, 
The zoning ordinance requires that water 
be delivered and that it be delivered in certain 
amounts to the properties, and the purpose up in that 
area to have that water delivered. And the zoning 
ordinance requires that it be delivered at no cost to 
the people in the developments. 
Now, their -- the North Fork Special 
Service District has been persecuting me because I 
pointed out -- I pointed out that in 1995 Dave 
Boshard and Rodney Despain, of the North Fork Special 
Service District, took money out of the water tank 
fund, which was a felony in and of itself, and then 
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they started billing people for water which the 
people own, because the developer is required to give 
the water to the people at no charge. And the reason 
they're supposed to do that is because they're 
supposed to protect the fire -- the area from fire, 
irrigate the ground so that weeds don't grow and that 
natural vegetation can grow, and this is specified 
clearly in the zoning ordinance, and the water 
demands have become higher. When the North Fork 
Special Service District charges money for water, 
they are counteracting the clear intent of the zoning 
ordinance. 
Now, just yesterday I found this deed. 
It's a deed to the -- it's a deed to the first owners 
of Pamela Vincent's property. All of -- and it's a 
quit claim deed from the development, Sundance 
Recreational Resort plat B. And it says: Together 
with water rights appurtenant to, or now used with 
sai d property. 
When Vincent -- Vincent was one of three 
properties that were previously subdivided and 
included in Sundance Recreational Resort plat B, and 
they had water rights. My -- the previous owner of 
my property bought water rights at the same time. 
And I -- and on the plat map it says that these three 
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1 properties were able to take their water rights into 
2 the development. 
3 And this deed clearly illustrates that 
4 they had a water right which they bought from the 
5 North Fork Special Service District, and they used it 
6 unhesitantly, without any charge, until the water 
7 tank fund got depleted by illegal spending by Dave 
8 Boshard and Rodney Despain. And then they decided 
9 they owned the water and they could steal it. The 
10 zoning ordinance clearly states that the water rights 
11 belong to the property and not to the North Fork 
12 Special Service District. 
13 And I have water rights. And so any -- I 
14 had water rights when I was there associated with my 
15 property. The same water rights here, which was 
16 about, who knows,..4 acre feet every year. And any 
17 money that they charged before I used more than .4 
18 acre feet was extortion. And besides that, because 
19 they made me -- because they made me operate -- at no 
20 time could I cooperate with the water district in 
21 supplying water to Pamela Vincent because it would 
22 have been a felony for me to induce the North Fork 
23 Special Service District to serve Pamela Vincent. 
24 So they haven't been forthcoming, they've 
25 been violating the law all along. They're violating 
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the law this very moment because they actually took 
my water line away from me. There was no judge that 
ever said that they could use the substandard water 
line, a water line which was not built by the 
developers of the North Fork -- of the Sundance 
Recreational Resort's plat B and plat D. 
I have more to say, but you gave me five. 
THE COURT: Well, I only scheduled a half 
an hour for this hearing. I divided the time up 
equally between both sides and the plaintiff is 
entitled to have the last word.* So you used your 
time as you thought it was appropriate. 
So counsel, do you have anything in 
response? 
MS. MELLOR: Your Honor, rather than to 
respond to a lot of those1 accusations, is there any 
specific questions that you would have for me 
regarding anything? 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. MELLOR: Otherwise I believe it would 
be appropriate to submit off of argument (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you. 
Well, Mr. Bennion, I have listened 
carefully to your arguments today and they're very 
impassioned, you've been very persuasive and 
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1 you've --
2 MR. BENNION: May I say one more thing? 
3 THE COURT: Yes, sir, uh-huh 
4 (affirmative). 
5 MR. BENNION: The reason I discharged my 
6 attorney is because she conducted hearings in secret 
7 without notifying me, and I'd expressly told her for 
8 --so anything that happened on this case in recent 
9 months was without my permission, without my 
10 knowledge, and is suspect, entirely suspect. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir. 
12 All right. Well, you've talked a lot 
13 about the merits of the case and you've argued 
14 issues, as counsel has pointed out, have been argued 
15 before. And I allowed you a lot of leeway here this 
16 morni ng - -
17 MR. BENNION: Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: -- because you're representing 
19 yourself and not -- and that you're not a member of 
20 the bar. So I wanted you to be able to express 
21 yourself. But you've got a couple of problems here 
22 today and they have to do with the rules of civil 
23 procedure. 
24 There are arguments that are stated in the 
25 briefs and in the memorandums and in the responses 
CitiCourt, LLC 
r e m \ c-3-> T>/i/ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
which are not appropriate and that should be stricken 
because of the rules of procedure. 
And I agree with the plaintiff and grant 
the motion to strike the portions of defendant's 
memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment, Exhibit A, which is your 
affidavit, as well as Exhibit F, excerpts from Pamela 
Vincent's deposition. And specifically , that those 
pleadings that have been stated are not consistent 
with the rules 7(c) and 3(b), the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, regarding these affidavits. 
The rule says the opposing party shall 
provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
affidavits or discovery materials. And the responses 
to the plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts are 
unsupported by citation to the relevant materials. 
And in contrast, plaintiff supports its fact with 
affidavits and declarations of David Boshard, 
director of services for North Fork, as well as 
Rochelle Anderson, the district clerk, as well as the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that are 
presented in support of the plaintiff's arguments by 
Judge Stott and his decision signed November 25th, 
2008. 
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1 • So I do find that the responses are 
2 deficient because you've denied these facts without 
3 citing materials. And therefore, I strike those 
4 responses as outlined in the motion. 
5 As well as -- I acknowledge that 
6 inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling 
7 on a motion for summary judgment, so an affidavit 
8 which does not purport to meet the requirements of 
9 Rule 56(e), Mr. Bennion, must be subject to a motion 
10 to strike as well. And that's supported by case law 
11 cited by Ms. Mellor as well. And she correctly 
12 points out that those affidavits merely reflect the 
13 affidavits with unsubstantiated conclusions that fail 
14 to state any evidentiary basis of facts that are 
15 insufficient to create issues of material fact. 
16 I also agree with the plaint iff on her 
17 motion to strike your affidavit, attached as 
18 Exhibit A, because the assertions there lack any 
19 foundation or conclusory and are moot as well, since 
20 they have been decided by Judge Stott in the prior 
21 case. 
22 And then I strike the reference to 
23 deposition of Pamela Vincent because in the previous 
24 litigation she was deemed legally entitled to connect 
25 to the Bennion lateral water line. I know you 
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vehemently disagree with that, Mr. Bennion, however, 
that has been previously litigated. And so her 
deposition taken in anticipation of other litigation 
has already settled that issue. It's irrelevant 
today and it's now moot. And so those are the basis 
for striking the affi davit. 
Now, there's a motion for summary judgment 
before me today. And pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bennion, a party 
is entitled to summary judgment, if what I have 
before me, in the form of pleadings of affidavits, 
show there's no genuine issue as a material fact, 
then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. And the moving party, which would be 
the plaintiff here, has that burden of presenting 
evidence that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. 
Pursuant to that standard, Mr. Bennion, 
I'm determining this morning that the plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law in the 
amounts owed for the services, the base user fees, 
the excess water user fees, the interest and the 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
No genuine issue of material fact has been 
presented that the plaintiff provided services to 
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you. That plaintiff's assertion is supported by 
declarations and the findings of fact as I've stated. 
There are no genuine issues of material 
fact about the leaks on the defendant's lateral water 
line. Judge Stott, in his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, already determined that the 
defendant is responsible for maintaining his lateral 
water line, whether or not he uses the water. 
Ms. Mellor pointed that out and she's correct this 
morning. 
There are no genuine issues of material 
fact regarding the damages asserted by the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff has proved the damages by offering 
invoice for the defendant's base user fees and the 
excess water use. 
Defendant was made aware of the graduated 
scale charges for excess water use during the earlier 
trial and defendant denies the plaintiff's assertions 
regarding that without any citation to any supported 
documents. So the defendant is responsible for the 
leaking and the excess water usage along the Bennion 
lateral water line as cited in that previous case by 
J u d g e S t o 11. 
So in conclusion, then, the motion to 
strike is granted and the plaintiff's motion for 
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summary judgment is granted. 
Anything further? 
MS. MELLOR: Your Honor, I would just -- I 
have information -- Mr. Bennion has provided that he 
is living in Nevada. If he would just provide the 
Court and myself an updated address. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bennion, that's necessary. 
You are representing yourself in the case and when 
you come into court and provide yourself to the 
Court, I think it's important that you let us know so 
we can send you pleadings, and you keep a current 
address with the Court on file. So do you have an 
address, sir? 
MR. BENNION: Yes. 3220 Mariner Bay 
Street, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
Ms. Mellor, ifyou'll prepare an 
appropriate pleading representing the decision of the 
Court as well as marshalling any other reference to 
your affidavit of law and argument to support the 
decision of the Court. Thank you. 
MS. MELLOR: Thank you. 
(Court adjourned at 11:41 a.m.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss . 
I, Robin Conk, Registered Professional 
Reporter, do hereby certify: 
That on November 28, 2011, I produced a 
transcript from electronic media at the request of 
Brady T. Gibbs; 
That the testimony of all speakers was 
reported in stenotype and thereafter transcribed, and 
that a full, true, and correct transcription of said 
testimony is set forth in the preceding pages, 
according to my ability to hear and understand the 
tape provided; 
That the original transcript was sealed 
and delivered to Brady T. Gibbs for safekeeping. 
I further certify that I am not kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
CERTIFIED this 28th day of November, 2011 
Robin Conk, RPR 
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Kasey L. Wright, Bar No. 9169 
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HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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4THDISTMCTCetWT 
STATEJKrtJTAH 
of Utah County, State of Utan 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I) 
DEFEND ANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
(II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM -
ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND 
(HI) EXHD3T "F" TO DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM -
EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA 
VINCENT'S DEPOSITION 
Case No. 080400633 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
On June 8,2011, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. At the 
hearing, Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Melissa K. Mellor, of HANSEN WRIGHT 
EDDY & HAWS, P.C, and Defendant was pro se. 
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The Court heard the arguments made on behalf of the parties, reviewed the applicable 
pleadings and file therein, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefore, ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: • 
1. The Court finds that statements in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Opposition Memo") contain statements 
that constitute inadmissible hearsay and/or lack proper foundation and support. 
2. The Court finds that the statements identified herein fail to adhere to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a party opposing a motion for summary judgment controverts 
specific facts asserted by the movant, "the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the 
grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials." Utah R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(B). . : ,,.. ' , 
3. Moreover, "inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.. .so an afEdavit which does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) maybe 
subject to a motion to strike." GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App. 
1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
4. The Court strikes the Defendant's following responses to Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Statement of Material Uncontested Facts" 
section) in Defendant's Opposition Memo because such responses are not supported by citation 
to any relevant materials: 
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"Defendant denies that all property owners located within the special service district 
boundaries are required to pay a monthly base fee for services. Defendant asserts that 
property owners may "opt out" of garbage collection services if they do not make use 
of these services. Defendant also asserts that property owners who do not receive 
water services from Plaintiff (i.e. in the instance their water service had been 
discontinued for non-payment or other reasons) are not required to pay a monthly 
base fee for services. Defendant farther asserts that for many of the properties within 
Plaintiffs boundaries, a water share is attached to the property and is owned by the 
property owners, and that therefore Plaintiffs [sic] are charging property owners for 
water actually already owned by those owners." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, 
Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 2, pp. 3-4). 
"However, Defendant asserts that questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff has 
the authority to establish such additional fees and penalties, and whether such 
additional fees and penalties are fair, reasonable, and justified." (Defendant's 
Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiff's Fact No. 3, p. 4). 
"Defendant asserts that questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is authorized to 
charge excess water usage fees to members who use more than 5,000 gallons during 
one month. A bald assertion by one of Plaintiffs employees that Plaintiff is 
authorized to take a certain action does not make that authorization a fact. Defendant 
further asserts that questions of fact exist with respect to requirements that property 
owners within Plaintiff's boundaries use a specified amount of water on their 
property during dry periods in order to protect the canyon from fires, and whether 
Plaintiff is justified for charging property owners who seek to fulfill these 
requirements." (Defendant's Opposition M e^mo, Response to Plaintiff's Fact No. 4, 
pp. 4-5). 
"Defendant had shut off the water to his cabin after Plaintiff had contaminated the 
line, and had specifically asked, on numerous occasions to have his water service 
discontinued. Plaintiff had both actual and constructive notice that Defendant did not 
wish to receive water services. Plaintiff voluntarily chose not to shut off the water to 
Defendant's cabin at the location where the lateral connected to the main because 
Plaintiff was using Defendant's lateral, despite its not meeting legal requirements for 
more than one customer, and without Defendant's consent or permission, to deliver 
water to other customers." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiff's 
Fact No. 6, p. 5). [Defendant references his affidavit, but his affidavit does not assert 
the afore-listed allegations.] 
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(e) "Neither Defendant nor his counsel have received any bills since that time." 
(Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 8, p. 6). [No 
supporting documentation or affidavit that Defendant did not receive any invoices or 
bills since August 23, 2008]. 
(f) "Defendant denies that he has never voluntarily paid for services provided by 
Plaintiff. Each year while he owned the property, Defendant voluntarily paid his tax 
bill when it was received, and a significant portion of this revenue is paid to Plaintiff 
for the maintenance and upkeep of the water system. Material questions of fact exist 
as to whether services were provided, and if services were provided, the amount 
owed for those services." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs 
Fact No. 9, p. 6). 
(g) "Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as to whether he is liable (and 
therefore possibly delinquent) for 'sanitation services' when he had opted out of 
garbage collection service and did not make use of this service. Defendant also 
asserts that material questions of fact exist as to whether he is liable for 'access to 
water... services' when Plaintiff was on notice, based on the proceedings in Fourth 
District Case No. 040401235 that he did not wish to receive such services." 
(Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 11, p. 7).' 
(h) "However, in this particular case, a material issue of fact exists as to who was 
responsible for maintaining the line in question. One property owner constructed an 
extension to Defendant's lateral line to provide water to his property. Another 
property owner, after the developer of her property failed to construct a required 
water system, connected to this extension. Plaintiff then used Defendant's lateral and 
these extensions to the lateral to provide water to the two additional property owners. 
Material questions of fact exist as to who was responsible for maintaining the section 
of the lateral providing water to these additional property owners: Plaintiff, 
Defendant, the two property owners, or the Developer who failed to construct the 
required water system in the first place, making it necessary for at least one resident 
of the recreational resort to tap into Defendant's lateral to obtain water." 
' (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 14, pp. 8-9). 
(i) "However, Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as the 
responsibilities associated with that ownership in that he had been denied control of 
the lateral." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 15, p. 
9). 
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(j) 'The question of whether Defendant is responsible for the water which Plaintiff and 
others caused or allowed to leak from the line during a time period when he did not 
wish any water services and was denied the right to turn off the water is the primary 
question at issue in this lawsuit." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to 
Plaintiffs Fact No. 16, p. 9). 
(k) "[W]hen it appeared Plaintiffs employees or representatives were preparing to dig 
near a gas line without previously acquiring information on the location of the gas 
line." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 17, p. 10). 
(1) "Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as to why Plaintiff initiated a 
condemnation action to obtain an easement across his property to build a water line 
into Sundance Recreational Resort Plat B. Defendant further asserts that "why" is 
rarely, if ever, a statement of fact, as a 'fact' is something that can be given a date and 
time, not a justification or explanation, 'after the fact' of why someone took or failed 
to take a particular action." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs 
Fact No. 19, p. 11). 
(m) "Material issues of fact exist as to how the amount of the charges was calculated. No 
formula or schedules were provided showing how charges were calculated. 
Defendant asserts that as a matter of law, he should not be found liable for the cost of 
any water passing through the line after the date Plaintiff was granted immediate 
occupancy in the condemnation action." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response 
to Plaintiffs Fact No. 21, p. 12). 
(n) "Defendant denies that he is delinquent in paying for any water usage. Whether he 
owes for excess water, and if so, how much, is the issue in dispute. As indicated in 
Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs previous statements of fact, many issues of 
material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff provided any services to Defendant, how 
much water passed through the line, who was responsible for the maintenance and 
repair of the line, whether Plaintiff could or should have taken action to repair the 
line it had taken possession of for its own benefit, and who was responsible for the 
water passing through the line." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to 
Plaintiffs Fact No. 22, pp. 12-13). 
5. A court may strike affidavits in which the asserted facts are not based on personal 
knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, or contain heairsay. Murdoch v. Springville Mun. 
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Corp., 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999). Moreover, an affidavit that merely reflects the affidavit's 
unsubstantiated conclusions and that fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an 
issue of fact. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
6. The Court hereby strikes Defendant's 2005 affidavit attached as Exhibit "A" to 
Defendant's Opposition Memo because his assertions lack foundation, are conclusory, and are 
irrelevant to the present action. 
7. The Court hereby strikes Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts 
and Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Opposition Memo for lack of foundation, conclusory statements, and 
inadmissible hearsay. 
8. The Court hereby strikes Defendant's argument in Defendant's Opposition Memo 
regarding jurisdiction and alleged notice requirements (Sections I and II of Defendant's argument 
section of his Opposition Memo, pages 16-18), since this matter has already been adjudicated in 
a decision made by this Court dated October 1, 2008. 
DATED this ffiflayof $ A t > 2 0 1 1 • 
B Y T H E C O I R T ^ O ^ 
Fourth JudicfU . ^ ^ . ^ 
Approved as to form: 
ROBERT F. BENNION, Pro Se Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I) DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, (II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM -
ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND (HI) EXHEBT "F" TO DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM - EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA VINCENT'S 
DEPOSITION, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this day of October, 2011, to the 
following: 
Robert F. Bennion 
3220 Mariner Bay Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89117 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Robert F. Bennion 
3220 Mariner Bay Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89117 
Re: North Fork Special Service District v. Robert Bennion. 
Case No. 080400633 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiff will submit the above and 
foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I) 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION 
MEMORANDUM - ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND (III) EXHIBT "F" TO 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM - EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA 
VINCENT'S DEPOSITION, to the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Utah 
for signature -upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days 
for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this g r^ - day of October, 2011. 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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F I L E D 
Kasey L. Wright, Bar No. 9169 
Melissa K. Mellor, Bar No. 10437 
HANSEN, WRIGHT & EDDY 
388 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 224-2273 
Facsimile: (801)224-2457 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case N... 0404012^5 
Judge Gary Stott 
At a hearing held on November 10, 2005, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Partial •• • 
Summary Judgment for the base user fees Defendant incurred between January 1. 1997 and 
January 1, 2002 in the amount of $3,524.31, which represented the base user fees and accrued 
interest. (Order was signed and entered on January 24, 2006). 
The remaining issues at trial were 1) whether or not Defendant was responsible for the 
excess water usage along a lateral water line servicing his property and 2) whether Plaintiff is 
entitled to the attorneys' fees it incurred in prosecuting this mattei \ bench trial w as held on 
this matter on October 10, 2008 before Judge Gary Stott, Plaintiff was represented by Kasey L. 
Wnght and Melissa K Mellor of Hansen, Wright, and Eddy, and Defendant was represented by 
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Claire SummerhiU. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence presented, this Court issues 
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. North Fork Special Service District ("Plaintiff") is a special service district organized 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff provides water services, garbage collection services, and fire protection services 
to properties located within its boundaries. 
3. Defendant Robert F. Bennion ("Defendant") owns certain real property ("Property") 
within North Fork's district boundaries. Defendant has continuously owned the Property 
prior to November 1997 through the present. 
4. From November 1997 through the present, the water services provided by Plaintiff to 
properties within its boundaries included the operation of a water delivery system. The 
water delivery system,operated by Plaintiff is the mechanism that provides culinary water 
to properties within Plaintiffs district boundaries. 
5. Plaintiff is responsible for the maintenance of the main water lines of its water delivery 
system. 
6. Plaintiff is not responsible for maintenance of lateral water lines that connect to the main 
water lines of Plaintiff s water delivery system. Rather, individual property owners are 
• responsible for the maintenance of lateral water lines servicing their properties. 
7. Prior to November 1997 through the present, Defendant has been the owner of the lateral 
water line from the point it connects to the Plaintiffs main water line at a meter box 
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located north of Defendant's Property to the meter box south of Defendant's property that 
is located on Pamela Vincent's property This lateral water line will hereina tier k: 
referred to as "the Bennion Lateral Water Line". 
8. The Court's finding that Defendant is the owner of the Bennion Water Line during the 
identified time period is based in part on Defendant's testimony that he owned such water 
line and upon his previous actions, including legal actions, where he asserted ownership 
to the Bennion Lateral Water Line. The Court's finding that Defendant is Hir owna of 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line is also based on the testimony presented by Plaintiffs 
employees". 
9. At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff charged members of the service district a 
base-user fee for water, fire, and garbage services. Plaintiff had. "the right to charge an 
excess water use fee to its members who use more than 5,000.00 gallons during a month 
The amount Plaintiff charged members for excess water use was based on a graduated 
scale adopted by PlaintifPs Board. 
10. Between November 1997 and May 1, 1998, approximately 1,649,000 gallons of water 
was taken out of Plaintiff s water svstein b> way at" the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
11. Defendant is responsible for the water that is taken out of PlaintifPs water system by way 
of the Bennion Lateral Water Line regardless of whether Defendant actually uses such 
water or whether the water is lost through leaks loca ted in the Bennion Lateral Water 
Line. This finding is based on the Court's finding that Defendant is the owner of the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line. The Court's finding that Defendant is responsible for the 
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water that is used or lost through the Bennion Lateral Water Line is also based on the 
testimony presented at trial that Defendant prohibited Plaintiff from placing a meter on 
the Bennion Lateral Water Line that would have more accurately determined how much 
water was actually used by Defendant. 
12. Pursuant to the graduated scale adopted by Plaintiffs Board, Plaintiff billed Defendant 
$ 11,706.98 for the excess wrater that went through the Bennion Lateral Water Line 
between November 1997 and May 1,1998. 
13. Defendant is responsible for the excess water use on the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
14. Plaintiff is obligated to pay Plaintiff SI 1,706.98 for excess water use from November 1, 
1997, through May 1,1998. 
15. At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiffs Board authorized Plaintiff to charge interest 
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on delinquent accounts. 
16. Defendant has not paid Plaintiff $11,706.98 for the excess water use between November 
1997 and May 1,1998. 
17. At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff has provided Defendant with regular 
statements of the fees that he owes to Plaintiff for the services provided by Plaintiff. 
18. Plaintiff has provided water, garbage, and fire protection services to Defendant from 
November 1, 1997 to the present. 
19. Defendant has never voluntarily made a payment to Plaintiff for the services Plaintiff has • 
provided to Defendant. 
20. Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in this matter totaling $37,980.00. 
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21. Defendant filed a Counterclaim in this case. Defendant's Counterclaim alleged that 
Plaintiff authorized and permitted an illegal connection to the Bennion I a teral Water 
Line in violation of federal, state, and local law. Defendant's Counterclaim also alleged 
that Plaintiff had permitted or performed repairs to the Bennion Lateral Vv ater Line in 
violation of federal, state, and local laws. 
22. On October 12, 2004, Judge Derek P. Pullan of Fourth District Court dismissed 
Defendant's Counterclaim. One of the Court's reasons for dismissing Defendant, • 
Counterclaim was on the basis ofres judicata. Specifically, the Court found that the 
issues raised by Defendant in its Counterclaim were either previously presented oi w ere 
available to be presented in a previous action that was dismissed with prejudice. 
23. On October 1.3. 2004, Defendant filed a motion for the Court to reconsider its dismissal 
of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
24. The Court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider on or about February L 2005. 
25. On January 24, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Partial SLUMP xrv J udgment 
regarding the base user fees. The Court's Order stated that Plaintiff had the right to 
charge base 'fees to its members and that Defendant is responsible to pay Plaintiff the 
base user fees. The Court's Order also warned the Defendant against promoting litigation 
without a reasonable basis. 
26. Defendant appealed the Court's Summary Judgment Order regarding Defendant's 
obligation to pay the base user fees to the Utah Supreme Court on February 27, 2006. 
27. Defendant's appeal., was dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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28. Defendant's defenses and claims in this matter had no basis in fact or law and were 
therefore without merit. 
29. Defendant acted in bad faith in this case by promoting litigation without a reasonable 
basis. Defendant's promotion of litigation without a reasonable basis is evidenced by the 
claims, defenses, and appeal enumerated in paragraphs 21 through 27 herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant is the owner of the Bennion Lateral Water Line., 
2. Defendant is responsible for the maintenance, including repair of leaks, of the Bennion 
Lateral Water Line from the meter box where the Bennion Lateral Water Line connects to' 
North Fork's main water line until the meter box at the Pamela Vincent property. 
3. Defendant is obligated to pay Plaintiff the established fee for the garbage, water, and fire 
protection services that Plaintiff provides to D efendant5 s Property. 
4. Defendant owes Plaintiff $ 11,706.98 for excess water use between November 1997 and 
May 1,1998. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the 
delinquent amount of $11,706.98. Such interest shall accrue from August 1, 1998. 
6. Pursuant to §78B-5-825 Utah Code Ann., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys' 
against Defendant in the amount of S37,980.00. 
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ORDER 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the principal amount c f 
$ 11,706.98 for Defendant's excess water usage from November 1997 through May 1, 
1998. 
Plaintiff is awarded interest on the judgment at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum, from August 1, 1998 through October 10.. 2008, for a total interest amount of 
$14,284.84. 
Plaintiff is entitled to continuing interest at the rate of 12% per annum until the judgment 
is paid in fill] , 
The Court shall release to Plaintiff the remaining bond previously posted by Defendant in 
this casein the amount of $12,475.69. as partial satisfaction of this judgment. 
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendant for the reasonable attorneys' fees it 
incurred in this matter in the.amount of $37,980.00. 
DA TED this p) _ day of ' V\JJ\J^M^— , 2008. 
B Y THE COURT: 
QMuD, 
JUDGE GARY/OTOTT" '•'" 
Fourth JudicialiJistrict Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this 
^ day of October, 2008, to the following: 
Claire Summerhill 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 956 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
SECRETARY 
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FEB 2 ? 2001 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA VINCENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant and Counter 
Claimant, 
vs. 
PAMELA VINCENT, AND NORTH FORK 
SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT, 
Counter Defendants. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant, Counter 
Claimant and Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH FORK LAND COMPANY, a 
dissolved Utah corporation, 
NORTH PINE PROPERTY OWNERS 
Third P.niv Dol'endanl 
Before the Court is Third Party Defendant North Fork Land Company's Motion to 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 980405600 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
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Dismiss. The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda, now grants the motion to dismiss. 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Pamela Vincent and Defendant/Plaintiff Robert Bennion are neighbors residing in 
the North Fork of Provo Canyon just off the Alpine Loop Road. 
2. Pamela Vincent has occupied her home for approximately five years. Robert Bennion has 
owned or had an interest in his home for approximately 10 years. 
3. Robert Bennion allowed a previous owner of a nearby resident X to tap into and build a 
second water line from Robert Bennion's water line that currently goes to his residence. 
4. The previous owner of Pamela Vincent's home later tapped into the nearby resident X's 
waterline and built a third water line going from the residence's water line to Pamela 
Vincent's home. 
5. On about September 16, 1998, Robert Bennion mechanically altered the connections in a 
junction box located where the residential water line servicing Pamela Vincent and Robert 
Bennion's homes branch from the main water line so as to shut off all the water along the 
road on which the parties' live. 
6. On September 21, 1998, Pamela Vincent filed a complaint and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order enjoining Robert Bennion from interfering with the delivery of water 
along the water line servicing both his residence and Pamela Vincent's residence. 
7. Robert Bennion answered and filed a counterclaim against Pamela Vincent and Counter 
Defendant North Fork Special Service District claiming that he had never granted Pamela 
Vincent or the preceding owner to tap into X's water line, nor did he give the nearby 
resident X authority to grant such permission to Pamela Vincent or the previous owner of 
Pamela Vincent's residence. The counterclaim against North Fork Special. Service District 
claims that the District has no ownership right in Robert Bennion's pipeline and has no 
right to continue providing water to Pamela Vincent through his water line without just 
compensation. 
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On November 2), 1998, Robert Bennion entered a third party complaint against Third 
Party Defendants, North Fork Land Company (Land Company) and North Pine Property 
Owners Association (Owner's Association). Both third party Defendants are dissolved 
Utah corporations. The Land * • . , - ^ *;.*• i< : *; w h 
Pan, : * • *. ^* ••, / v.*";*;,i :• e^ a: e\L c:i^ :• - Robert Bennion alleges 
that the Land Company and The Owners Association agreed to provide each lot in the 
subdivision in which Pamela Vincent resides with water from a culinary water system and 
that they have failed to do so, causing Bennion damages. 
Plaintiff Vincent and Defendant Beiin ion took positive step& tow ard settleinci 1 but did not 
succeed Defendant Bennion5s counsel withdrew from, the case November 9/2000 and 
Mr. Bennion proceeded pro se 
On November 27, 2000, North Fork Land Company filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing 
that Robert Bennion's cause of action is barred by two Statutes of Limitations. 
On December 18, 2000, N orth Foi k I and Compan} fl led a Notice to Submit leu Decision. 
On Decembei 21 , 2000., Robert Bennion faxed to the Court: a "Comment on Motion to 
Dismiss of Attorneys for North Fork Land Company" and "Additive Amendments And 
Parties. Modified North Fork Land Claims." No Mailing Certificate or Return of Service 
was included. 
( '\ , a ^ a / - -'* „ *\ :^;t zicuv. • : * . • - / , . , * -\ J„..; (C^ b i.~a <: nn 
t* Bl .K •)-.;. '-."^ i's < "r, ; ,>rk :.a.\: i.ompany l*> h m'\u-" Officers and Owners. \ o 
Mailing Certificate or Return of Service was included. 
On January 29, 2001, Robert Bennion filed his Arguments Against Motion to Block 
Discovery of North Fork Land Company Its Former Officers and Owners A 1\ Jailing 
Certificate was uuiuilnl 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Third Party Defendant North Fork Land Company argues that Third Party Plaintiff Robert 
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Bennion failed to bring his claims within two (2) years of North Fork Land Company's dissolution 
and the claims are therefore barred by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (repealed 1992). North Fork 
Land Company also argues that Robert Bennion failed to bring this action within six (6) years of 
the date of the abandonment of the construction of the water delivery system in approximately 
1991 and therefore his claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5. 
Mr. Bennion argues that North Fork Land company defrauded Utah County citizens and 
violated Utah County Zoning Ordinance § 7-27-A, B which requires that persons assisting in land 
development are liable for obtaining valid permits and obeying ordinances. Mr. Bennion argues 
that under United States Code § 26A-1-123, a corporation or its officers remain liable forever for 
any violation of public sanitation or zoning ordinance and that the statute of limitations does not 
apply. In addition, Mr. Bennion argues that Utah County Zoning Ordinance §l-6-H provides that 
"an unlawful use [of land] remains unlawful forever. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a) provides that an action related to improvements of 
property "based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of 
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction." The statute of limitations 
begins to run when the last event required to form the elements of the cause of action occurs. 
Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The Court finds that in this case, the 
statute of limitations began to run when North Fork Land Company abandoned construction of 
the water delivery system sometime previous to its dissolution in 1991. Mr. Bennion did not file 
his action until November 1998, seven years after the last event required to form the elements of 
Mr. Bennion's cause of action. Therefore, the Court concludes that Mr. Bennion's cause of 
action is barred by Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-21.5(3)(a). Because the action is barred by this 
statute, the Court will not address Defendant's argument that Mr. Bennion's action is barred 
under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Robert Bennion did not file his complaint within the six (6) year time period 
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allowed for the filing of actions related to improvements cf property. Therefore Plaintiffs action 
is barred by Utah Code Annotated §78-12-21.5(3)(a) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is 
granted. 
Defendant'1 ''ounsel is U» piepair j'i "idei «. onsistcn! wilh this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
DATED this JU day of. .,-2001, 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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RECEIVED 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
...;*. No 980405600 
Date: September 4, 2001 
Iudge Steven L. Hansen 
vs. I 
PAMELA VAINCENT, AND NORTH 
FORK SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT, 
Counter Defendants. 
B - M * ' ** v ' \ * . v/mpel and Motion for Discovery Sanctions. 
The Court, having reviewed and considered all relevant memoranda, now makes the following 
ruling: 
Plaintiff Pamela Vincent moves to impose sanctions for Defends * -\ • ~-^ ;:- - .^r 
failure to comply with disco\ei \ On April . /« M ' I 'In/ i ml Jci •.: --. >
 :„-s request b\ M> 
\"rincent for sanctions, but indued Mr Bennion to respond to interrogatories by May 18, 2001 
and to pay Mr Howry's attorney fees for failure to appear at a deposition Mr, Bennion's 
deposition was set for May 10, 2001 and once again, he failed to appear. In addition, Mr. 
Bennion once again failed to respond to Interrogatories and Requests foi Prodi iction :)f 
Documents. 
\ dditic rial 1> , IVli Bennion has failed to submit any opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel and Motion for Discovery Sanctions. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion is granted. Mr. 
PAMELA VINCENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant s • 
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Bennion's pleadings are stricken and the lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
DATED this S day of yCi/Jj
 r 2001 
BY THE COURT 
STEVEN L. ' S | N | l p G B f e # § ; 
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